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I Since March 2011 Research Student at CASED
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I Security Aspects of Piecewise Hashing in Computer Forensics
(Accepted at IMF Mai 2011)
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Motivation [1/2]
I Main question: Is it possible to identify similar files based on a
fingerprint, which depends only on the files’ byte structure?
I Cryptographic hash functions follow the avalanche effect:
Changing a bit in the input affects ≈ 50% of the output bits
→ no match
I Fuzzy hashing promises to overcome this problem and
discover similarities based on fingerprints.
I Question addressed in this talk: How reliable are the results of
Kornblum’s approach for fuzzy hashing with respect to an
active adversary?
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Motivation [2/2] - Applications
1. Forensics (on the file level): Detect similar files
I Blacklisting:
I Detect manipulated suspicious files
I Find fragments of suspicious data
I Whitelisting: Find variants of unsuspicious files
2. Biometrics: Template protection
3. Malware: Detect obfuscated malware (e.g. metamorphic
malware)
4. Junk mail detection
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Kornblum’s Fuzzy Hashing
Fuzzy Hashing by Kornblum
I Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing (CTPH)
(software named ssdeep)
I Developed in 2006 based on spamsum-algorithm from
A. Tridgell
I Key elements:
I Block size
I Rolling hash
I Traditional hash / piecewise hashing
I Signature
I Pioneer: dcfldd
I Blocks had a fixed size
I Non-propagation = yes alignment robustness = no
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Kornblum’s Fuzzy Hashing
Key Elements
I Block size: b
I binit = bmin · 2blog2(
n
S·bmin )c
I Rolling Hash at position p in the file:
I rp = F (np−s+1, np−s+2, . . . , np)
I Allows to compute rp+1 cheaply from rp by removing the
influence of np−s+1 and including the new byte np+1
I Traditional Hash / Piecewise Hashing:
I Currently, ssdeep makes use of Fowler/Noll/Vo (FNV)
I Alternative hash functions are possible (e.g. SHA-1, MD5)
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Kornblum’s Fuzzy Hashing
Workflow
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Kornblum’s Fuzzy Hashing
Kornblum Signature
I 2 Signatures:
I Signature 1: Using block size b (at most 64 characters)
I Signature 2: Using block size 2b (at most 32 characters)
I Sample Kornblum signature of test-file1:
1 24:T0tUHZbAzIaFG91Y6pYaK3YKqbaCo/6Pqy45kwUnmJrrevqw+oWluBY5b32TpC0:
T0tU5s7ai6ptg7ZNcqMwUArKvqfZlMC0,"/test-file1"
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Security Aspects
Characteristics of Kornblum’s Implementation
I Signature comparison:
I Only signatures with the same block size or within a factor of
2 can be compared
I A successful match needs at least one common substring in
the signature of length 7
I A signature has at most 64 characters
I If block size is known, we can calculate trigger sequences:
I Easy observation: A trigger sequence for b is also a trigger
sequence for all block sizes b
2k
I Concatenation of trigger sequences yields signature characters
(e.g. MY WOR in previous example)
I Attack type depends on the file syntax:
I BMP / ASCII-files can be changed ‘everywhere’ (easily)
I JPG / PDF-files allow a change of header information
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Security Aspects
Attacks?
What do we like to achieve?
1. False negatives for blacklisting → anti-blacklisting
I Modified incriminated files are not detected by the blacklist
although perceptual identical to the original known-to-be-bad
file
2. False positives for whitelisting → anti-whitelisting
I Incriminated files are modified to get a signature of a
known-to-be-good file
I Modified incriminated file is perceptual identical to the original
known-to-be-bad file
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Security Aspects
Attacks for Anti-Blacklisting
I Blow up a file: Block size gets larger
I Edit trigger seq.: Block size gets different (unpractical)
I Edit between trigger seq.: Change one byte in every 7th
chunk
I Adding trigger seq.: Add several trigger seq. in the
beginning of a file
I No semantic attacks like rotations, colour changes, ...
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Security Aspects
Anti-Blacklisting: Blow up a File
1 $ ls -la hacker_siedlung.jpg
2 -rw-r--r-- 1 user user 68650 2011-02-23 13:57 hacker_siedlung.jpg
3
4 $ dd if=/dev/urandom of=hacker_siedlung.hacked.jpg bs=1 count=280000
5 280000+0 records in
6 280000+0 records out
7 280000 bytes (280 kB) copied, 1.39661 s, 200 kB/s
8
9 $ dd if=hacker_siedlung.jpg of=hacker_siedlung.hacked.jpg conv=notrunc
10 69653+0 records in
11 69653+0 records out
12 69653 bytes (70 kB) copied, 0.20225 s, 344 kB/s
13
14 $ ssdeep -l hacker_siedlung.jpg hacker_siedlung.hacked.jpg
15 ssdeep,1.0--blocksize:hash:hash,filename
16 1536:FLVoUaX+ns+6iAuLNdElzt/CclGbn2OCFN8DXg1BSXHaL++:
17 F3l6ew33lG2OMBSXa6+,"hacker_siedlung.jpg"
18 6144:F6jOMBEjZML1AecfyqefFgQ5wDg+b7LQ7vZOubiPZ:
19 F4OMq6i8qefFgUlTsub6Z,"hacker_siedlung.hacked.jpg"
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Security Aspects
Attacks for Anti-Whitelisting
I Edit between trigger seq.: Change one byte in each chunk
I Adding trigger seq.: Add several trigger seq. in the beginning
I Difference: Adding information vs. editing information
I More computational power than for anti-blacklisting
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Security Aspects
Example: Editing Between Trigger Sequences
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Security Aspects
Example: Adding Trigger Sequences
I File need to be changed in the beginning
I One may use global trigger sequences:
I Example: Insertion of concatenation of trigger sequences
AAAD?HpAAAD?OgAAAD?QIAAAJ?MWAAAJ?PJAAAJ?V0 yields
Kornblum’s signature: 9v7PFZ
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Conclusion
Summary
I CTPH from Kornblum does not withstand an active adversary
with respect to
I blacklisting
I whitelisting
I Doubtful if piecewise hashing can fulfill the expectations of
fuzzy hashing
I Typically it is possible to flip one bit in each chunk
I In order to create a viable new fuzzy hash function, it will be
necessary to find different approaches
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Conclusion
Future Work
I Conduct a study if CTPH is applicable in forensics
I Clear definition of:
I What we expect from a fuzzy hash function?
I What is a metric for similarity?
I Find a more general approach, which also addresses images,
videos, ... not only txt files
I Proof if this might be possible on byte level
I Otherwise new techniques might be needed:
I E.g. first extract features then hash (e.g. FFT for images)
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Contact, Discussion
Thank you for your attention!
I Frank Breitinger, Harald Baier
I {frank.breitinger,harald.baier}@cased.de
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